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keyboard_tab Digital Market Act 2022/1925 EN

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2022/1925 EN cercato: '   when' . Output generated live by software developed by IusOnDemand srl


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    CHAPTER I
    SUBJECT MATTER, SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS

    CHAPTER II
    GATEKEEPERS

    CHAPTER III
    PRACTICES OF GATEKEEPERS THAT LIMIT CONTESTABILITY OR ARE UNFAIR

    CHAPTER IV
    MARKET INVESTIGATION

    CHAPTER V
    INVESTIGATIVE, ENFORCEMENT AND MONITORING POWERS

    CHAPTER VI
    FINAL PROVISIONS


whereas    when:


definitions:


cloud tag: and the number of total unique words without stopwords is: 301

 

Article 16

Opening of a market investigation

1.   when the Commission intends to carry out a market investigation with a view to the possible adoption of decisions pursuant to Articles 17, 18 and 19 it shall adopt a decision opening a market investigation.

2.   Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the Commission may exercise its investigative powers under this Regulation before opening a market investigation pursuant to that paragraph.

3.   The decision referred to in paragraph 1 shall specify:

(a)

the date of opening of the market investigation;

(b)

the description of the issue to which the market investigation relates to;

(c)

the purpose of the market investigation.

4.   The Commission may reopen a market investigation that it has closed where:

(a)

there has been a material change in any of the facts on which a decision adopted pursuant to Article 17, 18 or 19 was based; or

(b)

the decision adopted pursuant to Article 17, 18 or 19 was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information.

5.   The Commission may ask one or more national competent authorities to assist it in its market investigation.

Article 17

Market investigation for designating gatekeepers

1.   The Commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether an undertaking providing core_platform_services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(8), or in order to identify the core_platform_services to be listed in the designation decision pursuant to Article 3(9). The Commission shall endeavour to conclude its market investigation within 12 months from the date referred to in Article 16(3), point (a), In order to conclude its market investigation, the Commission shall adopt an implementing act setting out its decision. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 50(2).

2.   In the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the Commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the undertaking providing core_platform_services concerned within 6 months from the date referred to in Article 16(3), point (a). In the preliminary findings, the Commission shall explain whether it considers, on a provisional basis, that it is appropriate for that undertaking to be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(8), and for the relevant core_platform_services to be listed pursuant to Article 3(9).

3.   Where the undertaking providing core_platform_services satisfies the thresholds set out in Article 3(2), but has presented sufficiently substantiated arguments in accordance with Article 3(5) that have manifestly called into question the presumption in Article 3(2), the Commission shall endeavour to conclude the market investigation within 5 months from the date referred to in Article 16(3), point (a).

In such a case, the Commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article to the undertaking concerned within 3 months from the date referred to in Article 16(3), point (a).

4.   when the Commission, pursuant to Article 3(8), designates as a gatekeeper an undertaking providing core_platform_services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations, but which will foreseeably enjoy such a position in the near future, it may declare applicable to that gatekeeper only one or more of the obligations laid down in Article 5(3) to (6) and Article 6(4), (7), (9), (10) and (13), as specified in the designation decision. The Commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent the gatekeeper concerned from achieving, by unfair means, an entrenched and durable position in its operations. The Commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 4.

Article 21

Requests for information

1.   In order to carry out its duties under this Regulation, the Commission may, by simple request or by decision, require from undertakings and associations of undertakings to provide all necessary information. The Commission may also, by simple request or by decision, require access to any data and algorithms of undertakings and information about testing, as well as requesting explanations of them.

2.   when sending a simple request for information to an undertaking or association of undertakings, the Commission shall state the legal basis and purpose of the request, specify what information is required and fix the time limit within which the information is to be provided, as well as the fines provided for in Article 30 applicable for supplying incomplete, incorrect or misleading information or explanations.

3.   Where the Commission requires undertakings and associations of undertakings to supply information by decision, it shall state the legal basis and purpose of the request, specify what information is required and fix the time limit within which the information is to be provided. Where the Commission requires undertakings to provide access to any data, algorithms and information about testing, it shall state the purpose of the request and fix the time -limit within which it is to be provided. It shall also indicate the fines provided for in Article 30 and indicate or impose the periodic penalty payments provided for in Article 31. It shall further indicate the right to have the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice.

4.   The undertakings or associations of undertakings or their representatives shall supply the information requested on behalf of the undertaking or the association of undertakings concerned. Lawyers duly authorised to act may supply the information on behalf of their clients. The latter shall remain fully responsible if the information supplied is incomplete, incorrect or misleading.

5.   At the request of the Commission, the competent authorities of the Member States shall provide the Commission with all necessary information in their possession to carry out the duties assigned to it by this Regulation.

Article 30

Fines

1.   In the non-compliance decision, the Commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 10 % of its total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper, intentionally or negligently, fails to comply with:

(a)

any of the obligations laid down in Articles 5, 6 and 7;

(b)

measures specified by the Commission in a decision adopted pursuant to Article 8(2);

(c)

remedies imposed pursuant to Article 18(1);

(d)

interim measures ordered pursuant to Article 24; or

(e)

commitments made legally binding pursuant to Article 25.

2.   Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, in the non-compliance decision the Commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines up to 20 % of its total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that a gatekeeper has committed the same or a similar infringement of an obligation laid down in Article 5, 6 or 7 in relation to the same core_platform_service as it was found to have committed in a non-compliance decision adopted in the 8 preceding years.

3.   The Commission may adopt a decision, imposing on undertakings, including gatekeepers where applicable, and associations of undertakings, fines not exceeding 1 % of their total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where they intentionally or negligently:

(a)

fail to provide within the time limit information that is required for assessing their designation as gatekeepers pursuant to Article 3 or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information;

(b)

fail to comply with the obligation to notify the Commission according to Article 3(3);

(c)

fail to notify information or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information that is required pursuant to Article 14;

(d)

fail to submit the description or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information that is required pursuant to Article 15;

(e)

fail to provide access to data, algorithms or information about testing in response to a request made pursuant to Article 21(3);

(f)

fail to supply the information requested within the time limit fixed pursuant to Article 21(3) or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or explanations that are requested pursuant to Article 21 or given in an interview pursuant to Article 22;

(g)

fail to rectify within a time limit set by the Commission, incorrect, incomplete or misleading information given by a representative or a member of staff, or fail or refuse to provide complete information on facts relating to the subject-matter and purpose of an inspection, pursuant to Article 23;

(h)

refuse to submit to an inspection pursuant to Article 23;

(i)

fail to comply with the obligations imposed by the Commission pursuant to Article 26;

(j)

fail to introduce a compliance function in accordance with Article 28; or

(k)

fail to comply with the conditions for access to the Commission’s file pursuant to Article 34(4).

4.   In fixing the amount of a fine, the Commission shall take into account the gravity, duration, recurrence, and, for fines imposed pursuant to paragraph 3, delay caused to the proceedings.

5.   when a fine is imposed on an association of undertakings taking account of the worldwide turnover of its members and that association is not solvent, it shall be obliged to call for contributions from its members to cover the amount of the fine.

Where such contributions have not been made to the association of undertakings within a time limit set by the Commission, the Commission may require payment of the fine directly by any of the undertakings whose representatives were members of the decision-making bodies concerned of that association.

After having required payment in accordance with the second subparagraph, the Commission may require payment of the balance by any of the members of the association of undertakings, where necessary to ensure full payment of the fine.

However, the Commission shall not require payment pursuant to the second or the third subparagraph from undertakings which show that they have not implemented the decision of the association of undertakings that infringed this Regulation, and either were not aware of its existence, or have actively distanced themselves from it before the Commission opened proceedings under Article 20.

The financial liability of each undertaking in respect of the payment of the fine shall not exceed 20 % of its total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year.


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